In this paper, we develop a DSGE model to study the passive and time-varying implementation of macroprudential policy when policymakers have imperfect and untimely information as commonly observed in low-income and developing countries (LIDCs). The model features an economy with two agents; households and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are the borrowers in this economy and need capital as collateral to obtain loans. The macroprudential regulator uses the collateral requirement as the policy instrument. In this set-up, we compare policy performances of permanently increasing the collateral requirement (passive policy) versus a time-varying (active) policy which responds to credit developments. Results show that with perfect and timely information, an active approach is welfare superior, since it is more e¤ective in providing …nancial stability with no long-run output cost. If the policymaker is not able to observe the economic conditions perfectly or observe with a lag, a passive approach may be preferred. However, this comes at the expense of increasing inequality. The results therefore point towards the need for a more cautious approach toward the passive policy which is usually advocated for LIDCs.
Introduction
The recent …nancial crisis has emphasized that there is the need for policies that enhance the stability of the …nancial system, namely macroprudential policies. However, the policy agenda is still very much evolving and there is scarce evidence on the implementation of these policies around the globe, especially for low-income and developing countries (LIDCs). 1 Hence there is a need to build theoretical frameworks that may help countries undertake these policies in the most e¤ective manner.
There are several ways macroprudential instruments could be designed and implemented, with important implications for the …nancial system and the overall economy. At least, it has to be taken into account that macroprudential policy has both bene…ts as well as costs. The bene…ts, when tools are used e¤ectively, include a more stable …nancial system, which in principle reduces the probability of a crisis and its impact when/if it happens. However, these tools could have other implications for the economy as they could restrict credit and general …nancial access and could have short and long-run output costs. 2 One plausible approximation of a macroprudential policy implementation is time-varying rules that tie policy settings to a pre-de…ned indicator. In theory, it is useful to vary macroprudential instruments over the cycle and it does not imply any long-run output cost. Another advantage of a rule-based approach is that it could help to overcome political pressures on the policy move and time-inconsistency problem. An alternative option would be a passive policy in which instruments tighten borrowing availability permanently.
The design of these policies will depend on the characteristics of each country. The literature has focused on studying macroprudential tools in developed countries, but the research on the desirability of these measures and how they should be designed for LIDCs is close to nonexistent. LIDCs have also experimented with macroprudential policies in recent years-as in other countries, the procyclicality of bank lending in LIDCs tend to amplify the cycle under temporary shocks, with potential consequences for …nancial system stability (Masson, 2014) . While there is a widespread consensus on the need to consider such macroprudential policies in LIDCs, there is much less agreement on what tools should be used or how they should be designed. Gri¢ th-Jones et al. (2015) point out that the …nancial systems and their regulation in LIDCs are still in their early stages of development, and that …nancial development 1 While the LIDCs are a diverse group of countries, they share characteristics common to all countries at low level of development.According to the IMF de…nition (IMF, 2014a), there are 60 countries in this group, accounting for about one-…fth of the world population; Sub-Saharan Africa accounts about 60 percent of the LIDC population. 2 See Arregui (2013) .
in these countries should be geared towards achieving simultaneously the goals of …nancial stability and inclusive growth.
Although LIDCs are a diverse group of countries, they are in general in a process of …nancial and institutional development with implications both for the nature of …nancial stability risks and the conduct of macroprudential policies. For developed countries, global thinking and practice seem to favor timevarying rules on instruments such as loan-to-values or capital requirement ratios. However, for LIDCs, this may not be the case. As Gottschalk (2014) points out, international …nancial regulation has been designed having in mind developed and emerging countries and includes some complex rules that LIDCs have di¢ culties in following. 3 For LIDCs, the combination of limited data availability, volatile economic conditions, and weak supervisory capacity can mean that a passive policy can be preferred, an active and time-varying use of macroprudential policy may be inadvisable. Maintaining permanently high capital or collateral requirements could be a more e¤ective approach under these circumstances (IMF, 2014b) . Nevertheless, these type of policies may bring dramatic output e¤ects through a¤ecting the availability and cost of credit which is already scarce credit in LIDCs. Such policies may also favor more well-o¤ segments of the population and enhance inequality, which can undermine progress in health and education, cause investment-reducing political and economic instability in LIDCs (IMF, 2014c).
In this paper, we build a model with speci…c features for LIDCs and that can serve as a benchmark for macroprudential policy evaluation in these countries. We focus on how macroprudential policy design should take into account data and capacity limitations which we proxy with the absence of complete information (without noise and timely). The model features two types of agents; households and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can access …nancial markets as long as they own capital collateral.
Macroprudential policy is represented by changes in the collateral requirement. We compare a passive macroprudential policy, in which collateral requirements are increased permanently; with an active policy, in which there is a countercyclical rule so that the collateral requirement responds to deviations of credit with respect to its steady state. For our comparison, we consider two scenarios: (i) macroprudential policymakers have complete information, (ii) macroprudential policymakers do not observe the relevant …nancial indicators with accuracy and in a timely manner. 3 According to Gottschalk (2014) , some of these countries seemed to feel that adoption of complex rules, initially designed for developed countries, was a way to signal they were adopting standards of international best practice, even if they were not the most appropriate to meet their needs (See Beck et al., 2013, chapter 5) . Nevertheless, complexity of policies is a relevant issue for LIDCs given their limited technical capacity to validate and monitor complex models and the lack of su¢ ciently large and reliable databases. Gottschalk (2014) argues that, as time went by, countries seem to have realized that the rules were not appropriate to them and prefer simpler alternatives.
In order to evaluate policies we adopt a positive approach complemented with welfare analysis. As in Angelini et al. (2014) , among others, we take regulation as given and calculate welfare values under this assumption to compare di¤erent policies. We also explore the e¤ects of policy on income distribution and inequality because of their obvious relevance for LIDCs. This paper relates to di¤erent strands of the literature. On the one hand, it is builds from DSGE models with collateral constraints such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Iacoviello (2005) or Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) . However, in our paper, unlike the others, the main source of collateral is capital, which better re ‡ects the features of LIDCs. 4 This paper is also related with the literature that studies macroprudential policies in a DSGE model, introducing such policies as a rule on …nancial regulation. Carrasco-Gallego (2014). However, all these papers refer to advanced and emerging economies, there is no mention to low-income or developing countries. Those papers use capital requirements or loan-tovalues as macroprudential instruments. In our paper, the instrument is the collateral requirement, which has a great importance on those countries. On the other hand, our study adds imperfect information responses under imperfect information for LIDCs. 5 In a broader monetary policy literature, Aoki (2003) or Orphanides (2003) analyze optimal monetary policy with noisy indicators. Nevertheless, these studies focus on monetary policy, not on macroprudential policies.
To our knowledge, our paper is the …rst one that studies the implementation of macroprudential policies under incomplete information. This is a relevant problem in LIDCs although it can also be applicable to some emerging and advanced economies as well. Thus, the features that we incorporate in the model for LIDCs are not con…ned to them. 6 This paper permits to analyze di¤erent policy options within a rigorous micro-founded model, suitable for policy evaluation. It provides a theoretical counterpart to empirical studies and policy papers that point out that the particular features of these countries may alter the optimal way to implement macroprudential policy. 4 The main source of macro-…nancial fragility in advanced and emerging economies has generally been housing booms. In LDICs, however, mortgage markets are still underdeveloped. 5 There are severalother papers that incorporate speci…c features of LIDCs in a DSGE setting. See Baldini et al. (2015) and Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) , for example. These papers are however silent on how macroprudential policies should be implemented in such countries. 6 We acknowledge that there are other issues relevant to LIDCs-such as low …nancial deepening, commodity exporters, low capacity, informality in the access to …nance, limited …nancial access, high exposure of the banking system to the government and weak policy frameworks for monetary and …scal policy-that could have an impact on how macroprudential policies should be designed and implemented. Future work should incorporate some of these features.
We also touch upon the e¤ects of these policies on inequality, a relatively unexplored topic in the context of macroprudential policy. In LIDCs, decreasing inequality remains as one of the most important macroeconomic policy objectives and policymakers attach considerable weight to distributional consequences of policies. By providing some insights on the inequality implications of macroprudential measures, we aim to bring a more complete picture on the issue for these countries. 7 Results show that macroprudential policies are e¤ective in improving …nancial stability by lowering the volatility of credit. If the macroprudential policymaker is able to observe economic indicators (complete information case), active time-varying policies are preferred to passive approaches. Active policies, being countercyclical, are more e¤ective to achieve …nancial stability without incurring in any long-run output cost. Passive policies, although they also manage to enhance a more stable …nancial system, they are not as e¤ective and they imply a permanently lower steady-state output. However, if policymakers observe the economic data untimely and with some noise (incomplete information case), this may not be the case. Under these circumstances, a passive approach may be more advisable even though it entails an output cost. However, this cost is not evenly distributed among agents and inequality increases.
Welfare values are in line with these results.
The policy implications of these results are clear-there should be an e¤ort in these countries to improve data and capacity issues to better monitor …nancial systems and to develop time-varying approaches which do not imply long-run output or inequality costs.
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 describes the macroeconomic and …nancial e¤ects of macroprudential policies. Section 4 describes how these policies a¤ect inequality. Section 5 present welfare results. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We consider an in…nite-horizon economy. The economy is populated by in…nitely lived agents, entrepreneurs (borrowers) and households (savers). There are capital producers that sell the capital goods output to entrepreneurs. Households rent labor to entrepreneurs and consume the …nal good; they also trade non-contingent one-period bonds issued by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs consume and use labor 7 Several recent studies analyze inequality implications of various policies and shocks in a heterogenous agents setting which may allow the interaction of availability/cost of credit with occupational choice and/or …rm entry . Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) , for example, …nd that lower collateral contsraints bring sizeable inequality gains as some of the high productivity/ lower income households become entrepreneurs and increase their income. As we use a representative agents model, these important channels are shut down. and capital to produce the …nal good; and use capital as collateral to access …nancial markets. The macroprudential instrument is the collateral requirement.
Entrepreneurs/Firms
Entrepreneurs produce the …nal consumption good according to a Cobb-Douglas production function in domestically located labor l t and capital k t , which depreciates at rate over time:
Entrepreneurs maximize their lifetime utility from the consumption ‡ow c t . We denote with E t the expectation operator conditional on time t information and with the entrepreneurs' discount factor.
Entrepreneurs solve the following problem: 
where is the entrepreneurial discount factor, b t represents borrowing of the entrepreneur, R t is the interest rate, q t is the price of capital and w t is the real wage. 8 Assuming that k is collateralizable, we denote z the value of capital collateral required to obtain one unit of loans. Then, the entrepreneur faces the following borrowing constraint:
This collateral constraint is analogous to the ones used in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) Entrepreneurs choose labor and capital and how much to borrow from households; The …rst-order conditions are as follows: 8 Entrepreneurs are perfectly competitive. 9 In many LIDCs micro-…nance institutions are important suppliers of new credit, which is often uncollateralized, to households and small …rms. We abstract from such institutions in this paper.
where t is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint. The …rst-order conditions are the consumption Euler equation (4), labor demand (5), and capital demand (6) . The consumption Euler equation and the capital demand di¤er from the usual formulations because of the presence of the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
Households
We denote households' variables with a prime. Households enter each period with a bond coming to maturity. They derive utility from consumption and leisure. 10 They rent labor to the entrepreneur, lend b t , while receiving back the amount lent in the previous period times the agreed gross interest rate R.
Preferences are given by:
where is the discount factor, which is assumed to be greater than , the discount factor for entrepreneurs. 11 Households maximize (7) subject to the ‡ow of funds:
Solution of this problem yields the following …rst-order conditions:
1 0 Notice that entrepreneurs derive utility only from consumption because they do not work. 1 1 In a neighborhood of the steady state equilibrium, the multiplier associated with the entrepreneurs collateral constraint will be positive, so long as the entrepreneurial discount factor is lower than the households'discount factor , which in turn prices bonds. 
Capital Producers
Competitive capital producers use investment as materials input i t and produce new capital goods sold at price q t . We assume that the marginal return to investment in terms of capital goods is decreasing in the amount of investment undertaken due to the presence of adjustment costs.
The representative …rm solves:
The …rst order condition for i t is as follows:
Equation (12) captures the price of a unit of capital and it represents the optimality condition for the capital-producing …rms with respect to the choice of i t . 12 
Equilibrium
Goods markets clear:
Capital markets clear, so that the stock of capital used by the …rms in the economy evolves according to the following equation:
2.5 Welfare
To be able to assess the implications of di¤erent policies, we numerically evaluate welfare. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford (2008) , the two approaches that have been traditionally used for welfare analysis in DSGE models include either characterizing the optimal Ramsey policy, or solving the model using a second-order approximation to the structural equations for given policy and then evaluating welfare using this solution. We obtain a solution for the equilibrium implied by a given policy by solving a second-order approximation to the constraints, then evaluating welfare under the policy using this approximate solution, as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). As in Mendicino and Pescatori (2007),
we evaluate the welfare of the two types of agents separately. 13 The individual welfare for savers and borrowers, respectively, as follows: 14
To make the results more intuitive, we present welfare changes in terms of consumption equivalents.
The consumption equivalent measure de…nes the fraction of consumption that needs to be given up to equate the welfare under the new policy to the welfare under the baseline case (the policy is not active).
A positive value means a welfare gain, hence indicates that the new policy is more desirable from a welfare point of view. The derivation of the welfare bene…ts in terms of consumption equivalent units is as follows: 
where the superscripts in the welfare values denote the benchmark case when policies are not active and the case in which they are, respectively. 15 2.6 Macroprudential Policies 2.6.1 Active Policy: A Macroprudential Rule
As an approximation for a realistic active macroprudential policy, that is, one that is time-varying, we consider a Taylor-type rule for collateral requirements. 16 We can think of regulations on the required collateral as a way to moderate credit booms. Increasing collateral requirements when observing a credit boom makes the collateral constraint tighter and therefore restricts the loans that borrowers can obtain.
An issue in the implementation of a macroprudential rule would be the availability of relevant and timely data. Therefore, we consider the rule both when there is complete information and when there is incomplete information (noisy/inaccurate and untimely data). The presence of noise and lags in the data may trigger unwarranted or untimely policy responses which may introduce further volatility to the economy. The evaluation of alternative policy strategies should therefore consider cases where policy reacts to data that is not available in real time (when policy response must be decided) or it is available with substantial noise. 17 The rule with complete information Here, we propose the following rule:
where z SS is the steady-state value for the collateral requirement. b 0 measures the response of the collateral requirement to expected deviations of credit from its steady state. This kind of rule would be countercyclical, delivering higher requirements during credit booms, therefore restricting the credit in the economy and increasing …nancial stability. 18 Here we assume that the policymakers have complete information the state of the economy. 19 This policy, as opposed to a passive one, does not imply a change in the steady state of the economy when implemented.
The rule with incomplete information The macroprudential rule with complete information is implicitly assuming that the macroprudential regulators observe the current state of the economy promptly and accurately and can therefore adjust policy based on this information. In LIDCs, this may not be the case-substantial data lags and frequent data revisions are common in these countries. 20 As in the monetary policy literature, the availability of relevant data is certainly important for the correct and e¢ cient implementation of rules. 21 To study the case with incomplete information, we assume that variables are observed both with a lag and with an error. We consider that accurate measures of these variables, which are required for the implementation of an optimal rule, are not known until much later and with noise. We conjecture that (i) the policymaker observes credit with a lag of four quarters, and (ii) observes b t 4 (instead of observing E t b t+1 ) but with an error (x t ): Thus, b t 4 = e b t 4 + x t :The policy rule then becomes:
As pointed out by Orphanides (2003) , the information problem makes that the policy authority is also reacting to the noise processes. It is obvious that this may introduce undesirable movements in the macroprudential tool and make it less e¤ective.
We assume that the noise follows an AR(1) process:
where v t is drawn from an independent zero mean normal distribution with variance 2 v :
In LIDCs high credit growth can be the result of rapid …nancial deepening, and it remains unclear whether credit cycle phases driven by such structural …nancial market development necessarily warrant tighter prudential measures. See Martinez et al. (2017). 2 0 Additionally, on the conceptual front, de…ning a steady-state level of credit in LIDCs would also be particularly challenging given the level of …nancial development and depth. 
Passive Policy
For passive macroprudential policy we consider a permanent change in the collateral requirement (z), the macroprudential instrument, as opposed to varying it depending on economic or …nancial conditions. 22 Such policies are typically advocated for LIDCs as they are simpler in implementation than a timevarying approach as the data and capacity requirements could be less demanding. One implication of using this policy is that, since it represents a permanent change, the economy would reach a di¤erent steady state when it is implemented. Increasing collateral requirements means, for example, restricting credit permanently which may be undesirable.
Dynamic Properties
In this section, we compute impulse responses for an active versus a passive use of macroprudential policy with complete information to understand how dynamics change when macroprudential policies are in place. We present impulse responses for the three most paradigmatic cases: the benchmark case with no macroprudential policies, the active rule with complete information, and the passive policy (corresponding to increasing collateral requirements to the average increase implied by the active rule in order for the two cases to be comparable). Table 1 presents a summary of the parameter values used for the benchmark calibration. 23 The discount factor for households takes the usual value of 0:99 to re ‡ect an annualized interest rate of approximately 4%. The discount factor for entrepreneurs is slightly lower so that they are impatient agents. 24 As a benchmark collateral requirement, we use data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey Data. In SubSaharan Africa, the value of collateral needed for a loan is 183.2%. The capital depreciation takes a standard value of 3%: The capital share is about one third, consistent with the data. The labor supply value, re ‡ects a labor supply elasticity of one third, in line with the literature. 25 For our analysis, we will 2 2 A number of LIDCs already set the minimum regulatory capital ratio higher than international standards. For example, a higher regulatory ratio is imposed in Moldova, Uganda and Tanzania (See IMF, 2014,b). 2 3 We calibrate the model for a generic LIDC. Calibration for a speci…c country may pose di¢ culties because of data availability and results may not be applicable to other LIDCs due to large cross-country heterogeneity. 2 4 The value of this parameter is not crucial for the results, as long as there is a di¤erence between households and entrepreneurs discount factors that makes the collateral constraint to be binding. We take this value in line with Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) , in which it implies a steady state in which the retrun on entrepreneurial investment is 8%. 2 5 These values are consistent with Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) .
Parameter Values
consider demand shocks, that is, an additive shock " t in the log-linearized version of the Euler equation for households (equation 9). We assume that log (" t ) follows an exogenous stochastic stationary AR (1) process around a constant mean. As in the standard framework, this type of shock may re ‡ect changes in tastes or components of demand that do not react to the real interest rate, such as government expenditures. 26 As in Rabanal (2004) , the persistence of the demand shock is set to 0:80. 
Impulse Responses
Figure 1 displays the dynamics of the level of the collateral requirement, the instrument of the macroprudential policymaker, when there is a demand shock. 27 We compare the benchmark case, in which there are no macroprudential policies in place, with the case in which there are both active and passive policy.
For the active rule, we consider a reaction parameter of 0.5 and complete information. 28 We calibrate the passive rule in a comparable manner to the active one-we take the average increase of the collateral requirement implied by the macroprudential rule for the …rst 20 periods (of the impulse responses) and approximate a permanent equivalent increase in collateral requirement as a passive macroprudential policy. 29 For the benchmark case, the collateral requirement remains at its steady-state level (calibrated to 2 6 We have also experimented with technology shocks and have found that demand shocks emphasize our results and strengthen the positive e¤ects of macroprudential policies on …nancial stability. 2 7 We look at demand-side shocks (…scal shocks to shocks to external aid, for example) that are prominent for LIDCs. There does not seem to be an established consensus on the bene…ts of macroprudential policy in the face of supply shocks. For example, as opposed to Kannan et al. (2012) and Angelini et al. (2014) , Rubio and Carrasco-Gellago (2014) …nd the countercyclical use of macroprudential policy e¤ective and welfare improving in response to both demand and supply shocks. The source of the shock matters more if the interactions between monetary and macroprudential policy are studied because supply shocks may decrease in ‡ation while incresing credit gap (or growth), and hence may call for a con ‡icting monetary and macroprudential responses. We do not focus on these interactions in this paper. 2 8 For presentation purposes, we do not include impulse responses for the incomplete information case, since they are very unstable and make it di¢ cult the comparison. They are available upon request. 2 9 In the benchmark case, it is an increase in the requirement from 183.2 to 250, approximately. For the passive implementation of the policy, collateral requirements increase permanently. Note that this policy also achieves the goal of cutting credit but not in a countercyclical and temporary way.
Increasing collateral requirements once and for all does not only decrease short-term dynamics of credit but also its steady state. As output in the steady state also decreases, this passive policy entails . a long-run output cost. Figure 2 displays impulse responses for a demand shock, for the variables of interest in the model. 30 We can observe from the graph that macroprudential policies mitigate the e¤ects of the shock for aggregate output, especially if the policy is an active one, because of the countercyclicality of the rule. The increases in the collateral requirement that we observed in …gure 1 cut down borrowing in both macroprudential cases, more strongly though for the active rule. This dampening in credit makes entrepreneurial consumption not to increase as much as in the benchmark case, softening the e¤ects of the initial expansionary shock. Household consumption is the mirror image of entrepreneurial consumption since they now save less, responding to the cut in credit. The interest rate decreases more with a macroprudential tool. In models without collateral constraints, the interest rate matches the marginal product of capital. However, with collateral constraints, the interest rate is also determined by the collateral requirement. When the requirements increase, the demand for credit decreases and that makes its price decrease as well. 31 Overall, we see from the dynamics of the model that the increase in the collateral requirement that macroprudential policy imply have an e¤ective impact on credit, the goal of the macroprudential policymaker. The e¤ect is stronger for the active policy-although it mitigates further the e¤ects of the shock than the passive policy, it does not have long run credit and output implications. We take the standard deviation of borrowing as a proxy for …nancial stability. Not surprisingly, the more aggressive the rule is in reacting to deviations of credit from its steady state, the more e¤ective to deliver …nancial stability is (in the sense of achieving a lower volatility of credit). We see however that the marginal gains in terms of …nancial stability are decreasing. In fact, for very large values of the reaction parameter, …nancial stability is still improving but at a very small rate. Given this feature, it is not possible to …nd a value of the reaction parameter for which the variability of credit is minimized such that we could take it as optimal. This …nding goes in line with monetary policy studies that try to …nd an optimal parameter for the in ‡ation coe¢ cient in a Taylor rule. For instance, in SchmittGrohé and Uribe (2007), they …nd that deviating from the optimal policy rule by setting the in ‡ation coe¢ cient anywhere above unity yields virtually the same level of welfare as the optimal rule. Here, we also …nd that up to a certain threshold, the improvement in …nancial stability associated to increasing the aggressiveness of the rule is negligible. 32 For our analysis, we take a value of 0.5 for this parameter, Figure 4 shows the volatility of credit implied for di¤erent values of b , the reaction parameter of the macroprudential rule, both when there is complete and incomplete information. For our experiments, we have considered a 1% shock in the data noise with 0.8 persistence. 34 For incomplete information, we present three cases: (i) the data comes with a lag, (ii) the data is noisy, and (iii) the data comes with a lag and it is noisy. We see that for very low values of the reaction parameter, the rule is delivering similar results with complete and incomplete information, albeit the e¤ectiveness of the rule to enhance …nancial stability is limited in the latter. However, although more aggressive responses are e¤ective under complete information, they are counterproductive under incomplete information as they make credit more volatile.
Active Policy with Incomplete Information
borrowing associated with extreme values, we also …nd negligible improvements. For instance, a coe¢ cient of 100 implies a standard deviation of borrowing of 0.423537 and a coe¢ cient of 1000 a standard deviation of 0.421284. 3 3 The original Taylor estimates for in ‡ation and output response in the Taylor rule are 1:5 and 0:5 respectively.
If variables are observed with a lag, the rule performs only marginally worse than with complete information. When variables are observed with noise, the rule is less e¤ective than with perfect information and worsens in fact the stability of the …nancial system. The combination of lagged and noisy data exacerbates the results-in this case the macroprudential regulator generates more instability compared with the case with no macroprudential policy. However, if the policymaker is more cautious (responds with a low value of the reaction parameter 0:1), the e¤ects of the policy are more limited. 35 This graph suggests that if there is incomplete information and an active rule is applied, …nancial stability might get worse than the case without macroprudential policies, especially when increasing the aggressiveness of the rule. Results are in line with the general …nding in the literature on monetary policy under incomplete information that policy performance may change signi…cantly with noisy and lagged data to the extend that the use of an active policy rule can increase rather than decrease instability.
Nevertheless, as in the previous case, this policy does not represent a long-run output cost.
In the rest of the paper, incomplete information refers to the case here the data is noisy and lagged.
Passive Policy
Given that the active policy with incomplete information-as commonly observed in LIDCs-may not be desirable, we turn to an alternative policy. More speci…cally, in the presence of data and capacity limitations, a simple approach that does not rely too much on data collection or processing may be preferable-that is, a passive policy. As noted above, for passive macroprudential policy rule we consider a permanent change in the collateral requirement. This action may have implications for …nancial stability since now, the collateral constraint becomes tighter once and for all. On the one hand, this would improve …nancial stability. However, increasing the collateral requirements permanently implies reducing the steady state of credit and output. Therefore, even though this policy represents a bene…t in terms of …nancial stability, it may also entail a long-term cost in terms of output which is not desirable. Figure 5 displays the standard deviation of borrowing when collateral requirements are increased with respect to the benchmark initial point (183.2%). When collateral requirements increase, the standard deviation of credit decreases-a passive macroprudential policy is able to achieve a higher …nancial stability.
However, as …gure 6 shows, this policy also implies a lower steady-state level of output. Here, we show the output in the steady state that is obtained when increasing the collateral requirement permanently, 3 5 In subsequent sections, we will call this case "cautious rule under incomplete information." that is, making the collateral constraint tighter for entrepreneurs. This policy, even though enhancing …nancial stability, would limit the ability of entrepreneurs to access …nancial markets and therefore to borrow and produce. This means that the economy has permanently less resources for production and therefore the steady-state output decreases. 36 
Policy Comparison
In this section we compare the di¤erent ways of implementing macroprudential policy to assess whether and under which circumstances an active or a passive policy is preferred. To that aim, we study the implications of the di¤erent policies for …nancial and macroeconomic stability, as well as for the steady state of the economy, both under complete and under incomplete information. We assume that the objective of the macroprudential policymaker is to achieve a more stable …nancial system without compromising macroeconomic stability-a policy is preferable when it implies higher …nancial stability without a macroeconomic cost. In contrast, a policy that generates a lower steady state of output and borrowing is therefore less desirable even it provides …nancial stability. Figure 7 shows how …nancial stability changes with the collateral requirement for passive policies 3 6 Note that after a certain level of collateral, the impact of an increase in collateral on the steady state output becomes negligible. Even in lower collateral levels, however, the impact on steady state output seems rather small. If our framework would allow for occupational change-as in Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) , for example, such that a credit tightening may push some (productive) entrepreneurs to be workers-the output impact could have been more dramatic. Nevertheless, this result is in line with the literature on advanced and emerging markets that has found that the long-run cost of increases in capital requirements or bu¤ers on credit and output are generally small (See IMF 2014,b). For both rules we present the standard deviation of credit implied by a reaction parameter of 0.5. The lines are horizontal because …nancial stability does not depend on the collateral requirement, since at the steady state, it remains constant at the initial calibrated value. We also present in the graph, what we have called the "cautious rule," that is, the rule with incomplete information with a reaction parameter of 0:1, for which …nancial instability is not increasing with the policy but its e¤ectiveness is limited.
This "cautious rule" corresponds to the red dotted line.
Furthermore, …gure 7 also displays the steady-state values of borrowing and output for both the passive and the active rules (blue and black triangles, respectively). In turn, the black and blue circles correspond to the respective steady states of output.
From the graph, we can see that the active rule with complete information is preferred to the passive rule, in the sense that it implies a lower variability of borrowing, for plausible parameters of the collateral requirement. Furthermore, apart from the active rule being preferable from the point of view of …nancial stability, it does not have associated a long-term steady-state cost in terms of borrowing and output. In order for the passive rule to achieve the same …nancial stability as the active rule, the collateral requirement would have to go permanently as high as 833 percent, which would imply a However, if there is incomplete information, things change. The active rule under incomplete information always delivers higher variability of borrowing than a passive approach, even though the latter entails a long-run output cost. For the "cautious rule," the active rule is preferred to the passive rule up to a value of the collateral requirement of approximately 312 percent. The "cautious rule" under incomplete information is able to deliver higher …nancial stability than the case with no macroprudential policies but its e¤ectiveness is limited with respect to a more aggressive rule with complete information. 38 In Table 2 we convey these results: Table 2 shows the standard deviations of borrowing and output, as a proxy for …nancial and macroeconomic stability, for the benchmark (with no macroprudential policy) and for the passive and active rules (both complete and incomplete information). 39 As for the impulse responses, for the active rule, we consider a reaction parameter of 0.5. For the passive rule, we again take the average increase of the collateral requirement implied the macroprudential rule for the …rst 20 periods (of the impulse responses) and approximate a permanent equivalent increase as a passive macroprudential policy. Apart from their impact macroeconomic and …nancial stability, distributional consequences of alternative policies may be of interest, especially in LIDCs where inequality remains a top policy priority.
We take up this issue in the next section.
Macroprudential Policy and Inequality
The …ndings from the previous section suggest that, if the …nancial stability is the only policy objective, the passive policy should be preferred under incomplete information. However, this policy entails an output cost. The natural next step, especially from a point of view of LIDCs income per capita remains low alongside high inequality, is to check how this reduction in output is distributed among entrepreneurs and households. 4142 This gives us a sense of the inequality that it is present in the economy. Initially, entrepreneurs have a lower level of consumption in the steady state than households. 43 However, the gap between the two widens when we apply a passive macroprudential policy-the steady state output loss implied by the policy is not evenly distributed among agents. This means that introducing such a macroprudential tool is increasing the inequality among agents as an undesirable side e¤ect. 44 A way to numerically assess the level of the implications on inequality is to look at the Gini coe¢ cient which measures the inequality among agents of the levels of income or consumption. A Gini coe¢ cient of zero expresses perfect equality, that is, everyone has the same income. A Gini coe¢ cient of 100 expresses maximal inequality among agents, for instance only one person has all the income or consumption, and all others have none. In our case, we just have to levels of income, low and high, corresponding to the two agents in the model, entrepreneurs and households, respectively. Thus, we can use a simpli…ed calculation of the Gini coe¢ cient as follows: if the high income group is u % of the population and earns a fraction f % of all income, then the Gini coe¢ cient is f -u. 45 We approximate wealth of each individual As collateral requirements increase, the Gini coe¢ cient becomes larger, meaning that inequality goes up. 46 Therefore, even though using a passive policy may be a priori a good way of introducing macroprudential tools when there is data uncertainty, it has to be taken into account that, as a side-e¤ect, inequality increases permanently. This is not the case though with active policy. As shown in Figure 10 , under an active policy, Gini coe¢ cient improves temporarily-given the positive shock-but it goes back to the (same) steady state after a few quarters. Figure 10 : Gini Coe¢ cient. Active macroprudential policy, perfect information. Table 2 . We can see that the active policy does not represent a change in the steady state consumption, as compared with the benchmark case. However, output and borrowing in the steady state are decreasing for the passive policy and this is distributed di¤erently among agents. In particular, consumption of entrepreneurs (borrowers), which can be proxied as the poor people of the economy, drops. However, consumption for households goes up. This means that there is an increase in inequality. This result is supported by the Gini coe¢ cient that is larger for the case of the passive policy.
Welfare
As in Angelini et al. (2014) and other studies, the existence of macroprudential regulator is not microfounded in this paper. Rather, we take a positive approach in our welfare-based evaluation, since as it presents a broader view of the costs and bene…ts of macroprudential policy which may not be fully captured by the utility function of agents. We take the existence of the collateral constraint and the …nancial policy as given and compare policies in terms of (utility-based) welfare and the …nancial and macroeconomic volatility they generate. We assume that the objective of the macroprudential policymaker is to minimize the volatility in …nancial markets without compromising macroeconomic stability and long-term output. We will rank policies using these criteria, although welfare results are generally consistent with it. 47 
Active Policy with Complete Information
In terms of welfare, …gure 11 displays welfare gains from increasing the aggressiveness of the macroprudential rule. We can observe that entrepreneurs bene…t from this macroprudential policy because it delivers a more stable …nancial system, as also shown in …gure 3. However, although this policy does not entail a long-run output cost, it implies a cost in the short run. Savers, who do not care about …nancial stability, are worse o¤ because of the cost in terms of output, even if it occurs in the short run. In the aggregate, the economy is better o¤ with the measure.
Active Policy with Incomplete Information
Welfare losses from active policy under incomplete information are presented in …gure 12. This policy is welfare decreasing, especially for more aggressive rules, con…rming the fact that a more …nancially unstable scenario is created. With this policy we do not even observe a welfare trade-o¤ among agentthe active policy generates more instability in general makes all agents worse o¤ and hence it is not welfare enhancing for anyone in our set up. Implementing an active policy, which is desirable in the case of complete information, is welfare decreasing if taken with the noisy and untimely data. 
Passive Policy
The welfare gains implied by the passive policy ( Figure 13 ) are consistent with the above mentioned e¤ects on …nancial stability and output cost. Increasing collateral requirements implies increasing …nan-cial stability and this bene…ts entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs welfare directly depends on the volatility of consumption, which in turn, given the collateral constraint, is a direct function of the volatility of borrowing, our proxy for …nancial stability. The collateral constraint holds with equality in this model and therefore, entrepreneurial consumption is determined by the amount of loans that …rms can take.
Thus, even though increasing the collateral requirement represents an output cost, as seen in Figure 6 , entrepreneurs are better o¤ given the improvement in …nancial stability ( Figure 5 ). For savers though, this is not the case. Savers are worse-o¤ with the measure because their consumption does not depend on …nancial stability. In the aggregate, however, the economy bene…ts from the increase in …nancial stability, mainly coming from the entrepreneurs'side.
In order to disentangle the welfare e¤ects associated with the change in the steady state, we present …gure 14. This …gure displays the welfare gains for the deterministic case, which represents the change in regime due to the policy. We see that in this case, entrepreneurs are worse o¤. This is because, as we have seen, when applying the policy, borrowing and output decrease permanently, and this cut is unevenly distributed. Entrepreneurs end up in a steady state with less consumption and households slightly bene…t, that is, inequality increases. Therefore, there is a welfare loss for entrepreneurs and a welfare gain for households. In the aggregate, welfare is slightly increasing, re ‡ecting the fact that there is a redistribution of welfare among agents. Figure 15 compares the total welfare gains for the three policies: passive, active with complete information and active with incomplete information. We can observe that the passive policy is preferred to the active one only if collateral requirements increase to more than 400%. However, if there is incomplete information, the policy always generates losses and the passive policy would always be preferable. Nevertheless, as we have seen, this latter policy implies a long-run output cost that is unevenly distributed among agents and increases inequality. This is captured by the welfare calculated for the deterministic case.
Policy Comparison
In Table 4 we present the exact welfare values corresponding to each policy. We see that the active policy is preferred to the passive one, only if there is perfect information. Otherwise, a passive approach is more advisable but at the cost of generating more inequality in the economy. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a DSGE model to analyze the alternative ways of implementing macroprudential policy in LIDCs. In particular, we focus on the passive versus active implementation of the policy under di¤erent information assumptions. In our set-up, passive policy implies increasing collateral requirements
permanently. An active policy is represented by a countercyclical rule on collateral requirements that respond to expected deviations of credit from its steady state. However, for LIDCs, we consider that this indicator may be observed with a noise and/or with a lag.
Results show that macroprudential tools are e¤ective to reduce …nancial instability, since they lower the volatility of credit. We …nd that if the macroprudential regulator observes economic indicators timely and without an error, an active time-varying policy is preferred to a passive approach. An active policy, being countercyclical, is more e¤ective to achieve …nancial stability without incurring in a long-run output cost. A passive policy, although it also manages to enhance a more stable …nancial system, is not as e¤ective as an active one and it implies a permanently lower steady-state output.
However, under incomplete information-noisy and untimely data-, this may not be the case. Under these circumstances, a non-aggressive policy or a passive approach may be more advisable, though at the expense of a long-run output cost that is not evenly distributed among agents. We …nd that a passive policy increases inequality in the economy.
Welfare results con…rm these …ndings. Macroprudential tools, since they imply a more stable …nancial system, are welfare enhancing for the constrained group because their consumption volatility directly depends on the variability of borrowing. Looking at aggregate welfare values, we conclude that the active policy is preferred to the passive one, only under complete information. In a situation with data uncertainty, commonly observed in LIDCs, passive approaches are preferable but reduce welfare of entrepreneurs in the deterministic case because they widen their consumption gap with respect to households.
The results from the paper therefore point toward the need for a more cautious approach toward the passive macroprudential tools which is usually advocated for LIDCs. Long-run output, inequality and welfare implications of such tools could outweigh their macroeconomic and …nancial stability bene…ts.
Instead, it is more advisable for these countries to step up further the e¤orts to reduce data and capacity problems which, alongside the improvements in the policy framework and implementation, would allow them to better monitor …nancial systems and be able to use time-varying e¤ective approaches.
